INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was signed into law on July 4, 1966.I The FOIA gives "any person" the statutory right of access to government information. 2 Upon signing the new law, President Johnson wrote: "No one should be able to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest." 3 The general purpose of FOIA is "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." 4 This policy is furthered by placing the burden of proof on the agency seeking to prevent disclosure. 5 By the early seventies, critics suggested "that the act ha[d] become 4. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) , reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 38; S. REP. No. 1219 , 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964 , reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 93.
The current Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) , provides:
[The Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to matters that are -(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosures could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual. a 'freedom from information' law, and that the curtains of secrecy still remain [ed] tightly drawn around the business of our government." 6 Congress in 1974 amended the FOIA over President Ford's veto and attempted to close some of the "loopholes" in the original FOIA. 7 One "loophole" closed by the 1974 amendment was Exemption 7. 8 This exemption, as amended in 1974, 9 exempts from disclosure "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, or information which if written would be contained in such records," if the disclosure of the information would create one of the harms specified by the exemption. 10 Exemption 7 (1974 version) permitted an agency to withhold information which, if disclosed, would endanger pending investigations 11 or judicial proceedings, 12 personal privacy, 13 note 5, at 258 ("[l] t is the intent ... that the Federal courts be free to employ whatever means they find necessary to discharge their responsibilities [under the FOIA] .... I ask for your unanimous support for this legislation which is intended to close such loopholes and make the·right to know more meaningful to the American people."); 120 CONG. REc. 17,016 (1974) The original Exemption 7 in the 1966 FOIA provided that the Freedom of Information Act "does not apply to matters that are .
•. investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1966).
9. Exemption 7 was further amended in 1986. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) . See note 4 supra (text of current Exemption 7); note 10 infra (text of 1974 Exemption 7) . 10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982) . The 1974 amended Exemption 7 provided:
[The Freedom of Information Act] does not apply to matters that are ... investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982) .
12. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(B) (1982) . 13. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982) . 14. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982) . [Vol. 86:620 of law enforcement agents.16
The Supreme Court in FBI v. Abramson applies to all investigative files of the FBI regardless of whether they were compiled for law enforcement purposes (hereinafter called the "per se rule"). 21 Under the per se rule, the first prong of the Abramson test is automatically satisfied with respect to FBI records; the court must only determine whether their disclosure would cause one of the six harms specified in the statute. Accordingly, if the court finds that one of the specified harms will occur, the information can be withheld whether or not it was compiled for law enforcement purposes. In effect, the per se rule reads the statutory language "compiled for law enforcement purposes" out of Exemption 7 for FBI information. Cir. 1980) . The First Circuit has reaffirmed its use of the per se rule in light of the 1986 amendment to Exemption 7, see notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text, in Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1, 475 (1st Cir. 1987) .
Several district courts have also applied the per se rule. See Abrams v. FBI, 511 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ill. 1981); LaRouche v. Kelley, 522 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). poses" before Exemption 7 applies (hereinafter called the "threshold rule"). 22 Under this threshold rule each prong of the Abramson test must be satisfied before the information can be withheld. In theory, if the court determines that the information was not "compiled for law enforcement purposes," it would not even reach the second prong of the test, thereby foregoing consideration of whether disclosure would cause any of the six specified harms. The standard required for the threshold test has been expressed in varying language, all of which is generally deferential towards the FBI. 2 3 In 1986, Congress again amended Exemption 7 of the FOIA. 24 Although Congress made minor language modifications to the first prong, it remains virtually unchanged so far as the threshold requirement is concerned: disclosure may still be denied for "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes." 25 Congress did not offer any advice on the proper standard for the first prong of the Abramson test. 26 Therefore, the conflict among the federal courts of appeals over the first prong remains.2 1 It is likely that most FBI investigations are for proper "law enforcement purposes" and are carried out using proper means. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1981 ; Malizia v. United States Dept. of Justice, 519 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ; Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ; Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 23. See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text. 24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) . The actual amendment was contained in AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986 , Pub. L. 99-570, § 1802 , 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 to 3207-49 (1986 . See note 4 supra (text of current Exemption 7).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986 ). The requirement for specified harms remains, although the specific language has been changed. 28. This hypothesis is probably more true today than before such legislation as the FOIA because, in part, of the increased tendency to disclose publicly improper investigations. But it is also likely that if attempts to decrease the amount of law enforcement disclosure are successful, the number of improper investigations may well increase. See also note 111 infra. (Vol. 86:620 surveillance. 29 This Note examines Exemption 7 of the FOIA as it relates to FBP 0 information and seeks to determine the appropriate rule for the first prong of the Abramson test. Part I of this Note examines Exemption 7 in the 1966 Exemption 7 in the , 1974 Exemption 7 in the , and 1986 FOIAs, the judicial opinions interpreting this exemption, and the legislative histories of the 1966, 1974, and 1986 FOIAs as they relate to Exemption 7. Part II compares the per se and threshold tests in view of their practical effects and concludes that neither test is clearly superior. Part III proposes adoption of a per se rule with significant procedural changes. This modified per se rule provides that all "records or information" of the FBI are presumed "compiled for law enforcement purposes" under Exemption 7. However, when the requestor can show a "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" that the investigation was for political or other improper purposes or was carried out by improper means, the court must examine the requested documents in camera 31 to insure, if possible, that the political or other improper purpose or the use of improper means is disclosed.
I. THE 1966 , 1974 (1982) . Such inspections are currently at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973) ("Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will be necessary and appropriate. But it need not be automatic.").
32. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) , reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 38. cracy that covers up public mismanagement with public misinformation, and secret sins with secret silence." 33 The FOIA is, therefore, intended not only to give the public access to government information but also to allow the public to see how the government and public servants operate, including their mistakes and errors of judgment. 34
The original 1966 FOIA required the disclosure of government information unless the government agency could show that the requested information was exempt under at least one of the nine FOIA statutory exemptions. 35 Under the 1966 Act, Exemption 7 allowed for nondisclosure of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 36 The interpretation of the threshold requirement of Exemption 7 was at issue in only a few cases. These cases can be divided into two groups. In the first, the courts generally applied a two-part threshold test to determine if the information was "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and, if so, examined the information to determine if disclosure would harm 37 the government. Only if a specific harm to the government could be found was the file exempted from disclosure. 38
In the second group of cases, some of which were specifically overruled39 by the 1974 amendment of FOIA, the courts generally applied 33. 112 CONG. REc. 13,648 (1966) Cir. 1974) . Although the legislative history does not mention a one-part threshold test to determine if the file was "compiled for law enforcement purposes"; if the file was "compiled for law enforcement purposes," it was exempt from disclosure without further inquiry. 40 Thus under the 1966 FOIA, much government information may have been kept secret even when disclosure would not harm the government or its ability to function. It was in such an environment that the effort to amend Exemption 7 arose in 1974.
B. The 1974 Freedom of Information Act
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA were designed to correct various problems associated with the 1966 Act. 41 Most of these amendments were directed towards procedural reform rather than substantive changes. 42 There were, however, some substantive changes made to the FOIA, including the adoption of an amended Exemption 7, which allows nondisclosure of "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" only if disclosure would result in specific, statutory harms. 43 The 1974 S. 993 (1974) , the plaintiff sought to obtain FBI files concerning the assassina· tion of President Kennedy. The court found that the FBl's files were "investigatory in nature" and "compiled for law enforcement purposes," and then added " [w] The Hart amendment also clarified congressional intent. Substituting the word "records" for "files" suggests that courts should consider the nature and content of the files, rather than the "label" attached to them by the agency, in applying the Exemption. 120 CONG. REC. 17,034 trict of Columbia Circuit cases, 49 Senator Hart indicated that the court's interpretation of Exemption 7 erected a "stone wall" against public access to any material in an investigative file.so Significantly, the specific harms for which nondisclosure would be appropriate are included in the statutory language of the 1974 amended Exemption 7. Thus, the court in applying Exemption 7 is "require [d] ... to 'loo[k] to the reasons' for allowing withholding of investigatory files before making [its] decisions."s1
The 1974 amendment made other substantive changes in the FOIA that are useful in considering Exemption 7. A new sentence, explicitly allowing for the disclosure of a "segregable portion" of documents, was added to the FOIA section containing the nine statutory exemptions. This addition allows documents to be released after subject matter falling within the nine statutory exemptions is deleted. s 2 Furthermore, the use of in camera inspection of documents by the examining court was explicitly made available for Exemption 1, which relates to national security-related information. 55. 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973) (request was for documents classified as "secret" or "top-secret,'' relating to an underground nuclear test; court held that Exemption 1 did not allow in camera inspection of the classified documents to "sift out ... 'non-secret components' ").
Amended Exemption 1 now allows the court to inquire into whether the documents were properly classified. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1982) .
56. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380 , 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 12 (1974 , reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 225-26, 229; 120 CONG. REC. 6816 (1974) [ Vol. 86:620 confirmed congressional approval of the general use of in camera inspection where appropriate. 57 Both of these changes support the proposition that the basic congressional intent concerning the FOIA is to ensure that the emphasis is on disclosure.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in FBI v. Abramson adopted a two-pronged test for the 1974 Exemption 7: a requested document must "have been an investigatory record 'compiled for law enforcement purposes,'" and the release of the material must result in one of the six specified harms. 58 However, the issue in Abramson was whether FBI information originally compiled for "law enforcement purposes" loses its Exemption 7 status when it is later reproduced or summarized in a new document prepared for political purposes. 5 9 The issue of interest to this Note, the proper standard for the first prong of the Abramson test when the FBI file is not originally compiled for law enforcement purposes, was not before the Court in that case.
Judicial Interpretation of the First Prong of the Abramson Test -The Per Se Rule
The lower courts have differed in their application of the first prong of the Abramson test. Some courts have followed the per se rule in applying Exemption 7 to FBI files, holding that all "investigatory records" of the FBI, whether actually compiled for "law enforcement purposes" or not, are assumed to be "compiled for law enforcement purposes" in applying Exemption 7 to FBI files. 60 The first prong of the Abramson test therefore is not even considered under the per se rule; the court's only inquiry relates to whether disclosure would result in one of the six specified harms. At least when dealing with government agencies such as the FBI, courts applying the per se rule generally believe that the phrase "law enforcement purpose" in Exemption 7 is "a description of the type of agency [to which] the exemption is aimed. " 61 In Irons v. Bell, 62 the leading per se rule case, the plaintiff (a student activist, civil rights organizer, and draft resister during the 1960s) 57. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974) , reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 169 (The amendment was to "make clear the congressional intent -implied but not expressed in the original FOIA -as to the availability of in camera examination in all FOIA cases.").
58. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982) . 59. The Supreme Court held that such information "continues to meet the threshold requirements" of being "compiled for law enforcement purposes." 456 U.S. at 632.
60. This standard was first proposed under the 1974 version of Exemption 7. Courts applying the per se rule under the current exemption would likely hold that all "records or infom1a· tion" of the FBI, whether actually "compiled for law enforcement purposes" or not, are to be considered "compiled for law enforcement purposes" in applying Exemption 7 to FBI informa· tion. See Curran v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 474 n.1, 475 (1st Cir. 1987 Courts have articulated four policy arguments supporting the per se rule. First, the FBI would be seriously harmed if information, fitting within one of the six specified criteria or harms, was disclosed because the information was compiled for purposes other than law enforcement. For example, in Irons v. Bell the court pointed out that disclosure of an informer's identity, which normally would be exempt under Exemption 7, would be an " 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' ... [and] would harm innocent individuals who had no way to test the legality of an FBI investigation. " 7° Furthermore, such disclosures "would cost ... society the cooperation of those [informers] who give the FBI information under an express [or implied] assurance of confidentiality." 71 Second, these courts assert, generally without supporting empirical data, that the unlawful purposes of the FBI in such cases will be made public whether or not the actual, detailed information is disclosed. 72 Third, the FOIA should not "define and pro-63. 596 F.2d at 469. The FBI actually released most of the requested documents prior to the suit; however, everything except the plaintiff's name was blacked out. 596 F.2d at 470. 72. This argument is difficult to either support or refute since it is impossible to determine just how many instances where the unlawful purpose or activity occurs but is not made public.
[ Vol. 86:620 vide sanctions" for improper FBI activities. Rather, congressional action should provide the necessary sanctions. 73 Finally, it would be difficult to define workable standards to distinguish between a "colorably justifiable investigation" and a bogus investigation. 74
Judicial Interpretation of the First Prong of the Abramson Test -The Threshold Rule
Under the threshold rule of Exemption 7, the FBI must first show that the "investigatory records" were "compiled for law enforcement purposes. " 75 If the FBI can meet this threshold requirement and can then show that one of the six specific harms would occur or "could reasonably be expected" 76 to occur, the information is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. If, however, the FBI cannot meet this threshold requirement, the presence of one of the six specific statutory harms is, in theory, immaterial and the information must be disclosed (unless it can properly be exempted under one of the other FOIA exemptions77). In applying this threshold rule, courts look to the purpose of the investigation and not to the methods of the investigation. Thus if the investigation was for a proper "law enforcement purpose," the fact that illegal methods were employed is of no significance in applying the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. 78 Society is only aware of those cases that are made public. The court in Irons v. Bell notes that the "questionable character of FBI practices has been made public through the disclosures already made." 596 F.2d at 474. Although the "questionable character of the FBI practices" was dis- 76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) . The addition of the "could reasonably be expected" language in the specific harms tests for several of the subsections of Exemption 7 may not represent a significant change in the standard for each specific harm. See 132 CONG. REC, Sl4299-300 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986 ) (the second of two letters labeled "Exhibit I" from R. Ehlke, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, analyzing the substitution of "could reasonably be expected to" for "would" in several subsections of Exemption 7); J. Numerous statements of the standard used in the threshold rule have been presented. In general, they are very deferential to the FBI. 79 For example, in Pratt v. Webster the standard required that the FBI's investigatory activities be "related to the enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenance of national security" 80 and that this relationship be "based on information sufficient to support at least 'a colorable claim' of its rationality." 81 The standard used in Lamont v. Department of Justice required only a "good faith belief that the subject may violate or has violated federal law." 82 A "sufficient connection between the conduct of the investigation and legitimate concerns for maintaining national security" was required to meet the threshold rule in Ramo v. Department of the Navy. 83 Not only do these cases show that the threshold rule, as currently applied, is deferential to the FBI, but also that it is in fact difficult to set out standards for distinguishing between proper and improper investigatory purposes. 84 
C. The 1986 Freedom of Information Act
Congress recently complicated this debate by further amending the FOIA, including Exemption 7, in 1986. As amended, Exemption 7 now provides that an agency can withhold "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" if one of six listed harms would occur or "could reasonably be expected" to occur. 85 Supp. 127, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1979 ). Other courts have also employed deferential standards for the first prong. Only "a minimal showing that the activity which generated the documents was related to the agency's function" was required in Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp 1059 , 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1981 . And, the law enforcement agency had to "demonstrate at least 'a colorable claim of a rational nexus' between activities being investigated and violations of federal laws" in Malizia v. United States Dept. of Justice, 519 F. Supp. 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) .
The standard was satisfied in all of the cases cited in notes 80-83 supra.
84. See note 74 supra and accompanying text. 85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) . See note 4 supra (complete text of the current Exemption 7). In the current Exemption 7 only subsections 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F) contain the "could reasonably be expected to [occur]" language; subsections 7(B) and 7(E) retain the 86. The six specific harms included in the current Exemption 7 include the following: interference with an enforcement proceeding; deprivation of the right to a fair trial; "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; disclosure of "the identity of a confidential source"; disclosure of "techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations"; and endangerment of "the life [Vol. 86:620 significantly, the 1986 amendment to Exemption 7 does not appear to have changed the two-pronged Abramson test. 87 
D. The Legislative History
Although the legislative histories of the 1966 Act and the 1974 amendment are extensive, neither specifically discusses the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. And the legislative history of the 1986 amendment 88 specifically indicates that the latest amendment was not intended to change the two-pronged test under Abramson, although it does not indicate which test is actually appropriate for the first prong. 89 There are, however, some general principles and guidelines evident in the histories that aid the analysis of the threshold requirement.
While Congress was concerned about disclosure of sensitive FBI information, it nonetheless intended the maximum possible disclosure of nonsensitive FBI documents. The legislative histories of the 1966 Act and, especially, the 1974 and 1986 amendments suggest that FBI records should receive special consideration under Exemption 7 because of the nature of the information and the FBl's legitimate law enforcement role. Congress recognized that at least some government operations required secrecy; and the FBI was given as an example of an agency that required some level of secret operation. 90 This deferor physical safety of any individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) . The changes in the specific harms listed in Exemption 7 do not affect the analysis presented in this Note.
The 1986 amendment also changed "investigatory records" to "records or information" in the threshold language of Exemption 7. Compare Exemption 7 (1974 version), supra note 10, with Exemption 7 (1986 version), supra note 4; see notes 99-102 infra and accompanying text.
The 1986 amendment also made several additions that directly impact law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. These changes effectively allow the FBI to indicate that no record exists where the acknowledgment of the record's existence "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1986 There were also changes made to the fee and fee waiver structure of the FOIA in the 1986 amendments. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986 89. See note 102 infra and accompanying text. 90. In discussing the 1966 FOIA, it was noted in at least two Senate reports that, although the FOIA reflects "a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information,' " the Act "is also necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain material, such ence to FBI records could be accomplished under either the per se rule, with its complete deference to the FBI on the first prong of the Abramson test, 91 or the threshold rule, with its deferential standards. 92 But not all FBI activities were to be kept secret. Congress also wished to expose overreaching and illegal activities of the FBI while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the FBI in carrying out its legitimate law enforcement role. At the time of the 1974 amendment to Exemption 7, Congress was clearly aware of, and concerned about, Watergate and related activities. 93 Furthermore, Congress believed that the amended Exemption 7 would at least help prevent such occurrences. 94 Sess. 8 (1964) , reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 93 (One of the purposes of the FOIA was to prevent information from being withheld "only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities."); [Vol. 86:620 tions be narrowly construed in order to encourage disclosure. 95 In 1986 Congress further amended Exemption 7, 96 but it did not clarify which test courts should apply to determine the appropriate balance between disclosure and nondisclosure. The primary purpose of this amendment was to "fine-tune" 97 Exemption 7 to address concerns that "the confidentiality of informants and sensitive law enforcement investigations is jeopardized by FOIA disclosures." 98 The 1986 amended Exemption 7 does contain new language for the threshold requirement -"records or information" has replaced the "investigatory records" language of the 1974 amendment; 99 but the language associated with the threshold rule remains essentially unchanged, 100 so that any "records or information" withheld under Exemption 7 must still have been "compiled for law enforcement purposes." 101 Not only 120 CONG. REc. -17,038 (1974) 1983) . The stated purpose of the nmendment was "to modify the scope of the exemption for law enforcement records •.. and clarify congressional intent with respect to the agency's burden in demonstrating the probability of harm from disclosure." 132 CONG. REC. Sl4,296 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986 ) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 99. This change in the threshold language was intended to "resolve any doubt that law enforcement manuals and other non-investigatory materials can be withheld under (b) (7) IOI. The amended language in the threshold section of Exemption 7 merely broadens the materials (from "investigatory records" to the more general "records and information") to which did Congress leave the relevant language essentially intact, but it explicitly avoided clarifying which rule (threshold or per se) is appropriate for Exemption 7 under the first prong of the Abramson test. 102 Significantly, therefore, the legislative history associated with the 1966 FOIA and its subsequent amendments does not favor either the per se or the threshold rule.
II. COMPARISON OF THE PER SE AND THRESHOLD RULES

A. The Threshold Rule
The threshold rule as currently employed may lead to absurd results clearly not intended by a rational Congress. For example, under the threshold rule, if a "law enforcement purpose" is not found then, in theory, the inquiry is over and the information must be disclosed even if one of the six specified harms will actually occur upon disclosure. 103 This would still be the case if the non-law enforcement purpose could be exposed without disclosing the specific information leading to one of the six specific harms of Exemption 7. 104 For example, under Exemption 7(D), an informer who wishes to remain anonymous cannot reasonably be expected, when deciding whether to give information to the FBI, to determine if the FBI investigation is for Exemption 7 might apply. This change was "intended to ensure that sensitive law enforcement information is protected under Exemption 7 regardless of the particular format or record in which the record is maintained." S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983 431-501 (1984) (prepared statement, testimony, and related exhibits of William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). Congress was concerned with three general problems that Exemption 7 was thought to have created for federal law enforcement agencies in their legitimate law enforcement roles: (1) "disclosure of sensitive non-investigative law enforcement materials," (2) "premature disclosure of investigative activities," and (3) "the protection of confidential sources." S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983) . These concerns do not speak to the threshold issue.
103. A strict application of the threshold rule would mandate disclosure even if a specific harm would occur.
104. This potential problem appears to cause significant difficulties in four major areas: Exemptions 7(B) (depriving a person of the right to a fair trial), 7(C) (unwarranted invasion of personal privacy), 7(D) (disclosing confidential sources), and 7(F) (endangering life or physical safety of an individual). See note 4 supra. Under Exemptions 7(B) or 7(C), Congress probably did not intend that an innocent third party be deprived of his right to a fair trial or suffer an unwarranted invasion of his personal privacy because of improper activities of the FBI over which he has no control. And under Exemption 7(F), it seems unlikely Congress intended to endanger the "life or physical safety of any individual" because of improper activities of the FBI.
[Vol. 86:620 "law enforcement purposes." The informer's decision may be based on the FBl's ability to keep his identity secret. Thus, some confidential sources may dry up and the legitimate work of the FBI may be impaired. 105 In general, it is unlikely Congress intended that if FBI information was not "compiled for law enforcement purposes" then complete disclosure must occur even when it would cause harm to the FBI itself, third parties, or law enforcement personnel. This is especially true where the improper activity could be disclosed by deleting that information that would lead to the specific harm. Upon reflection it seems reasonable that Congress did not intend such harsh results. The purpose of the FOIA was to make as much information as possible available to the public. It was not intended to punish innocent third parties or law enforcement personnel because of possible excesses of the FBI.
Although a major advantage of the threshold rule is that it focuses the inquiry on the issue of whether the purpose of the FBl's activities is lawful or proper, it is unlikely that this focus would in practice significantly increase the probability that any illegal or improper activity 105. There does not appear to be any direct, empirical evidence to support this proposition. Critics of the 1974 Exemption 7 have, however, forcefully advanced this as a logical result of disclosing informers' identities. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 17,036 (1974) , 1st Sess. 62-93, 432-44 (1984) . Many of the examples suggest problems with law enforcement's application of the FOIA rather than with the FOIA itself. For example, a convicted loan shark was able to identify a government informant "because the suspected informant's name was not completely redacted" from the released documents. Id. at 67 (example 31, emphasis added). Failure to remove an informant's name should not be blamed on the FOIA. In still another example, an FBI informant was identified because the FBI released information detailing a meeting to discuss criminal activities attended by only three individuals; only the informant's name was removed from the released document. As Director Webster pointed out, the "name of the missing person also must be the name of the informant." Id. at 440, 452. Director Webster did not indicate why this was not simply a misapplication of the 1974 version of Exemption 7(D). Other examples indicate that potential informants refuse to assist law enforcement agencies because they fear that information that might identify them might "be given out by mistake. " See, e.g., id. at 83 (example 136) . Other law enforcement agencies have expressed similar fears in disclosing certain information to the FBI. Id. at 86, 88 (examples 153, 157, and 163) . But fear of such mistakes will persist under any system allowing some disclosure of information possessed by law enforcement agencies; the only "failsafe" solution (which would still be subject to politically motivated leaks, see, e.g. id. at 510 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The FBI has in the past been able to develop the art of leaking to a level of excellence which is the envy of most other agencies .... ")) would be to provide a blanket exemption to law enforcement agencies.
will be made public. The showing required for "law enforcement purposes" under the threshold rule is minimal under any of the statements of the existing standard. 106 To date there are apparently no cases where the FBI was actually forced to disclose significant information because of a lack of a proper law enforcement purpose. 107 Therefore, the practical effect of the threshold rule appears to be the same as the per se rule relative to the actual information disclosed. 108 Moreover, it may be extremely difficult to set out a workable standard for determining which investigations are for proper law enforcement purposes. It may be particularly difficult to distinguish between an investigation that lacks a law enforcement purpose and one that simply turns out to be a blind alley. 109 Further, in cases where there was clearly no "law enforcement purpose" but disclosure would result (Vol. 86:620 in significant harm, there may be a tendency to broaden the interpretation of "law enforcement purpose" to bring the activity into Exemption 7 and thus avoid the harm. The threshold rule in actual practice, therefore, tends to move closer to the per se rule. 110
B. The Per Se Rule
The per se rule treats all "records or information" of the FBI as being "compiled for law enforcement purposes." The major advantage of the per se rule is its ease of application. The rule promotes judicial efficiency; the court is not required to determine if the record was "compiled for law enforcement purposes." If it is true that most FBI investigations are in fact for "law enforcement purposes," 111 this inquiry into the law enforcement purpose can often be eliminated without defeating the goals of the FOIA. 112 If it is determined that one of the specific harms might occur (or might reasonably be expected to occur) by disclosure, then the information may be withheld. 113
A disadvantage of the per se rule is that the FBI is more likely, without close judicial supervision, to "cover-up" improper activities.114 Even in cases where the disclosure of the illegal activity is ultimately made, the disclosure may be significantly delayed. 115 This problem arises because the per se rule does not focus on the "law enforcement purpose" of the investigation. The possibility of such 111. The use of the modified per se rule should allow this assumption to be tested. Further, the deterrent effect of the modified per se rule should provide an inducement to the FBI to avoid investigations which are not for law enforcement purposes. See also note 28 supra.
112. For the vast majority of legitimate FBI investigations, the judicial inquiry into the "law enforcement purpose" issue would likely be insignificant. Only at the margins, where the "law enforcement purpose" could not readily be determined from the record, would significant judicial resources be required. But these would be the very cases where some type of FBI oversight is most needed and would be most helpful.
113. s. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) , reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 158 (Information "may be withheld where the agency makes a specific affirmative determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances presented dictate -as well as that the intent of the exemption relied on allows -that the information should be withheld. 115. The threshold rule may also have this problem. See Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059 , 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1981 . However, it may be an even greater problem when the per se rule is employed because the focus of the initial inquiry is not on the proper or improper "law enforcement purpose." "cover-ups" is clearly contrary to congressional intent. 116 Both the threshold and the per se rules have significant advantages and disadvantages, and neither is clearly superior to the other. A new rule, proposed in Part III, attempts to combine the major advantages of both the threshold and per se rules in the spirit of the congressional intent of animating the FOIA.
Ill. EXEMPTION 7 PROPOSED RULE: THE MODIFIED PER SE RULE Courts should adopt the per se rule for the first prong of the Abramson test 117 but with significant changes in its implementation. This new rule, termed the "modified per se rule," provides that all "records or information" of the FBI are presumed "compiled for law enforcement purposes" when applying Exemption 7. This is equivalent to the current per se rule. But when the plaintiff can show 118 a "reasonable likelihood in view of the circumstances" 119 of the investigation being for political or other improper purposes (that is, not for "law enforcement purposes") or being carried out by improper means, the court must examine the documents in camera 120 in order to assure, if at all possible, 121 that the political or improper purpose of the investigation or the improper means are disclosed. 122 The standards currently em- 118. This test clearly places the burden on the plaintiff to show "a reasonable likelihood in view of the circumstances" that the investigation was not for legitimate law enforcement purposes. It may be argued that this is inconsistent with the congressional decision to place the burden on the agency seeking to prevent disclosure. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
However, placing the burden on the FBI to show that the "record or information" was gathered for "law enforcement purposes" would essentially reinstate the threshold rule. Furthermore, the burden placed on the plaintiff is not siguificant. Generally the plaintiff need only suggest in some creditable manner that the investigation was more likely than not carried out for some reason other than a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The plaintiff should then be entitled to have the court inspect the records in camera. In most cases, the investigation will clearly be for law enforcement purposes; for example, one indicted for bank robbery will not be able to convince a court that the FBI investigation was for an improper purpose.
119. See text following note 128 infra. 120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) . See note 31 supra.
121.
Even under this test it may not be possible to release information concerning the improper purpose of the investigation. The court must still determine if exposing the actual unlawful purpose of the investigation would "reasonably be expected" to cause one of the specific harms listed in Exemption 7. See notes 126-27 infra and accompanying text.
122. Senator Muskie in Senate Bill 1142 offered an amendment to Exemption 1 of the FOIA that would have required in camera inspection of documents the government wished to withhold on grounds of national security classifications. This was considered an "excessive response" to EPA v. Mink, see note 55 supra, and was rejected. 120 CONG. REc. 17,022 (1974) (statement of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 303. Senator Muskie's amendment would have required in camera inspection for all documents coming under Exemption 1. The proposed per se rule only requires in camera inspection when the plaintiff can show a "reasonable likelihood" that the investigation was not for "law enforcement purposes." Therefore, in camera inspection will only be required for Exemption 7 cases on an infrequent basis. See notes [Vol. 86:620 ployed in applying Exemption 7 relative to the six specific criteria or harms would remain unchanged under the modified per se rule. 123 Whereas the per se rule reads the statutory language "compiled for law enforcement purposes" out of Exemption 7, 124 the modified per se rule proposed here effectively reads the language back into the exemption during the in camera inspection.
The primary purpose of the modified per se rule is to increase the likelihood of exposing the political or improper investigation or the use of improper investigatory means. It is important to note that under this modified per se rule the court cannot do anything that it does not currently have the power to do under the existing per se rule. In camera inspection is currently available at the court's discretion. 125 The modified per se rule only adds the requirement of in camera inspection in cases where the plaintiff can show the "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" of the information being compiled for purposes other than law enforcement or the investigation being carried out by improper means.
It is also important to note that the modified per se rule does not allow disclosure of sensitive information 126 that could not be disclosed under the current per se rule because it would cause, or reasonably be expected to cause, one of the specified harms. But the modified per se rule increases the probability that the improper conduct will actually be disclosed. Assume that the FBI had compiled a file on John Doe strictly for political reasons and the disclosure of that information would cause one or more of the harms specified in Exemption 7. Under the current per se rule the information could not be disclosed because of the specified harms; the lack of "law enforcement purpose" would never be an issue. 127 Under the modified per se rule the information still could not be disclosed for the same reasons; however, the court, upon an appropriate showing by the plaintiff, would inspect the documents to determine if the improper nature of the investigation could be disclosed without causing any of the specified harms. If 126. The amount of information disclosed will vary in each case. In some cases it may be possible to release the actual documents disclosing the improper purpose or method of the investigation if such disclosure does not result in the specific harms that Exemption 7 attempts to avoid. In other cases the court may only be able to indicate the improper purpose or method by releasing a conclusory statement giving only minimal details of the actual transgression. But such a conclusory statement would be better than simply ignoring the transgression. In still other cases even such a conclusory statement could be inappropriate because its mere release might result in one of the specific harms noted in Exemption 7.
127. Under the threshold rule, once it has been determined that the investigation was not for a "law enforcement purpose," the information should be disclosed without regard to any harm caused by the disclosure. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. without causing one of the six specified harms, such disclosure would be mandated. If, however, disclosure of the improper nature would also result in one of the specified harms, the disclosure of the improper nature itself must also be forbidden. In the latter case, the final outcome under the current and the modified per se rule would be identical. In the former case, however, the outcome might be very different. Under the current per se rule, the FBI might be able to hide or "coverup" the· improper purpose of the investigation at the same time it was allowed to withhold information that would result in one of the six specific harms. With increased judicial involvement under the modified per se rule, such a "cover-up" would be much more difficult.
Like most reasonableness standards, the proposed "reasonable likelihood" standard is not capable of precise definition. 128 The mere allegation by the plaintiff that the FBI investigation was not for "law enforcement purposes" would generally not be sufficient to satisfy this "reasonable likelihood" standard. The "reasonable likelihood" standard should be satisfied when the plaintiff can show, by either allegations or testimony, that the FBI investigation was more likely than not carried out for some reason other than legitimate "law enforcement purposes." 129 This standard does, however, require a case-by-case analysis. Therefore, the necessary showing will depend in large part on the particular plaintiff and the surrounding circumstances. Other factors, such as the timing and type of investigation, may play a significant role in particular cases. Nor should the plaintiff be required to show that the improper purpose was the only purpose of the investigation. The plaintiff's burden should only be to demonstrate with a "reasonable likelihood" that an improper purpose exjsted. Once the plaintiff makes such a showing, the court must subject the documents to in camera inspection. If in camera inspection confirms that the investigation was improper, such information should be disclosed if at all possible. 130 The [ Vol. 86:620 icy favoring the Greek dictatorship." 133 The FBI asserted that the investigation was strictly for law enforcement purposes including possible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 134 and possible deportation. 135 The court found that the plaintiff's allegations were "not frivolous on their face" and, over the FBl's strong objections, ordered the documents inspected in camera. 136 After examination of the documents and applying the threshold test, the court found "the investigation was not a mere sham designed to intimidate or embarrass him in his role of critic of Greek or American policy." The court further found that a "reasonably prudent government official" could have found a sufficient law enforcement purpose. 137 The court then examined the documents in view of the six specific harms of Exemption 7 and concluded that the majority of the information in dispute could be withheld.138
Demetracopoulos is an example where, under the modified per se rule, the court would be required to conduct an in camera inspection. The plaintiff was able to show 139 that his opposition to State Department policy towards Greece was, with "reasonable likelihood," the basis for the FBI investigation. Only by an in camera inspection could this allegation be tested if the FBI wished to "cover-up" any improper purpose. Although the actual information disclosed in Demetracopoulos under the court's threshold rule and the modified per se rule would likely be very similar in this particular case, 140 the thrust of the court's opinion might be very different. Under the threshold rule, the court, if it wished to protect sensitive information under Exemption 7, must find some legitimate law enforcement purpose. 141 Under the modified per se rule, such a "strained" finding 142 is not required. The specific harm test of Exemption 7 would be applied in the normal manner 143 regardless of the purpose of the investigation. But the court, if it found that the FBI was attempting to silence a government 133. 510 F. Supp. at 531. 134. 22 u.s.c. § § 611-621 (1982 140. The information disclosed under the court's threshold rule and the modified per se rule presented here would likely be the same because the court in Demetracopoulos employed in camera inspection of the documents, using its discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982) .
141. See text at note 110 supra. 142. In Demetracopoulos the court may have relied on just such a "strained" finding in order to invoke Exemption 7. The court found that "the investigation of plaintiff by the FBI was not a mere sham designed to intimidate or embarrass him in his role of critic of Greek or American policy." 510 F. Supp. at 531 (emphasis added).
143. See note 123 supra.
critic, could have exposed the improper purpose of the investigation without disclosing sensitive information. Exposure of such improper activities could have a strong deterrent effect. 144 Further, such findings could help Congress carry out its oversight responsibility. 145 There are many and varied reasons for adoption of the modified per se rule; some are illustrated in the above example. In most cases the judicial efficiency of the original per se rule will be retained because "most" FBI investigations are for "law enforcement purposes." And like the threshold rule, the focus of the inquiry will be on the potentially improper purpose of the investigation. The new rule also avoids the possibility, present in the threshold rule, that complete disclosure of FBI investigations not for "law enforcement purposes" will be required regardless of the injury to innocent third parties, law enforcement personnel, or to the ability of the FBI to carry out its legitimate function. 146 Also, courts will not be tempted to strain to find a proper "law enforcement purpose" to avoid disclosing "harmful" information as they might under the current threshold rule. 147 The modified per se rule, with its required in camera inspection in certain cases, may actually assure more disclosure than the threshold rule because it will be more difficult for the FBI to "cover-up" its improper activities due to the increased judicial inspection of documents in cases where the possibility of a "cover-up" is most likely. 148 The modified per se rule appears to be consistent with the legislative intent of the FOIA. In applying Exemption 7 to FBI investigations, the modified per se rule helps assure full disclosure except for information causing the six specified criteria or harms. It helps assure that improper FBI activities will be disclosed. And the modified per se rule respects and protects legitimate FBI activities; the FBI's ability to carry out its legitimate mandate is not impaired.
This proposed rule also has several additional advantages that neither of the current rules possess. Under the modified per se rule, the difference between an "improper purpose" and an "improper method" 14 9 loses its significance. The modified per se rule is triggered by a showing of "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" of either an improper purpose or the use of an improper method. The modified per se rule can also be applied to related issues. For example, where an investigation is started for legitimate law enforcement purposes but is later continued for improper purposes, the modified per se [ Vol. 86:620 rule could be employed to help assure that the improper nature of the continued investigation was disclosed. 150
The primary disadvantage of the modified per se rule is that the in camera procedure will require more judicial resources. But in camera inspection will only be required in a limited number of cases where the plaintiff can make a showing of "reasonable likelihood under the circumstances" of an improper purpose for the investigation. 151 When there are large numbers of documents, a random sampling of documents could be examined. 152 Futhermore, Congress, by specifically allowing in camera inspection for all nine FOIA exemptions, doubtless intended that such inspection be employed where appropriate to avoid improper withholding of information. Neither the threshold rule nor the per se rule, as applied to the first prong of the Abramson test, is clearly superior based on the legislative history of the FOIA or the practical effects of the two rules.
Courts should adopt a modified per se rule in applying Exemption 7 to information gathered by the FBI. Like the current per se rule, the proposed modified per se rule provides that all "records or information" of the FBI are presumed "compiled for law enforcement purposes" when applying Exemption 7. But when the plaintiff can show a "reasonable likelihood in view of the circumstances" that the investigation was for political or other improper purposes or that the investi-gation was carried out by improper means, the court must examine the documents in camera to assure that the political or improper purpose or means is disclosed. The modified per se rule will help assure that the FBI cannot "pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest." 15 6 -Richard A. Kaba 156. See note 3 supra.
